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Admiralty
by Colin A. McRae*
and Edgar M. Smith"
I.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
BILLS OF LADING

In Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp.,' the Supreme
Court of the United States had the opportunity to clarify whether 49
U.S.C. §§ 14706-14711' (the Court refers to these sections as the
Carmack Amendment) applies to the inland rail transit portion of the
international shipment of an intermodal container under a through bill
of lading.? The factual circumstances giving rise to the dispute were
quite similar to the facts in the recent cargo case of Norfolk Southern
Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd.,' as both cases involved
international shipment of cargo to the United States under a through
bill of lading during which the cargo was damaged on the inland rail leg
of the shipment.? The cargo interests-owners-in this case shipped on
a "K" Line vessel. Certain containerized goods from China were
damaged when the Union Pacific train carrying them from Long Beach
to the Midwestern United States derailed in Oklahoma.

* Partner in the firm of Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah, Georgia.
Yale University (B.A., 1995); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1999).
Member, Savannah Bar Association. Member, State Bar of Georgia. Member, Maritime
Law Association of the United States. Member, Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute.
** Associate in the firm of Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah, Georgia.
Georgia Southern University (B.B.A., summa cum laude, 2001); University of Georgia
School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2006). Member, Savannah Bar Association. Member,
State Bar of Georgia. Member, Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2433 (2010).
2. 49 U.S.C. §§ 14706-14711 (2006).
3. Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2442.
4. 543 U.S. 14 (2004).
5. Compare id. at 18, with Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2438-39.
6. Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2439.
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The bill of lading documentation covering the subject shipment
contained, among other provisions, a forum selection clause requiring
that any action relating to the rail carriage of the cargo be brought in
Tokyo, Japan. Despite this forum selection clause, the cargo interests
filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California for the
damage to the cargo. The defendants, including both vessel interests
and the rail carrier, removed the litigation to the United States District
Court for the Central District of California and filed a motion to dismiss
based on the Tokyo forum selection clause.
After the district court granted the motion to dismiss, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds
that "the Carmack Amendment applied to the inland portion of an
international shipment under a through bill of lading" and concluded
that the Carmack Amendment invalidated the parties' forum selection
clause.' Noting that this interpretation of the scope of the Carmack
Amendment was inconsistent with the stance taken by United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.'
The Supreme Court began with an examination of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA),'o which does not limit the parties' ability
to adopt forum selection clauses, before turning its attention to the
Carmack Amendment."
While acknowledging that the Carmack
Amendment does limit the parties' ability to choose the venue of their
suit, the Court took a closer look at the scope of the Carmack Amendment's applicability and rejected the cargo interests' contention that the
Carmack Amendment applied to the domestic inland segment of the
carriage in this case."
The Court focused on the Carmack Amendment's three different
classifications of carriers: "(1) receiving rail carriers; (2) delivering rail
carriers; and (3) connecting rail carriers."" "A 'receiving rail carrier'
is one that 'provid[es] transportation or service .

.

. for property it

receives for transportation under this part.""' "A 'delivering rail carrier' is one that "delivers the property and is providing transportation or
service subject to the jurisdiction of the [Surface Transportation Board]

7.
8.
994-95
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 2439-40.
Id. at 2440 (citing Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., 557 F.3d 985,
(9th Cir. 2009)).
Id.
46 U.S.C. §§ 30701-30707 (2006).
Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2440.
Id. at 2441-42.
Id. at 2442.
Id. (alteration in original); see also 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a).
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under this part,"" while "[a] connecting rail carrier is 'another rail
carrier over whose line or route the property is transported in the United
States .

..

under a through bill of lading."'16

Only a receiving rail

carrier is required to issue a Carmack-compliant bill of lading.
Therefore, the important question became whether a rail carrier
transporting goods during the inland portion of a through bill of lading
shipment constituted a receiving rail carrier for the purpose of the
Carmack Amendment. 7
The text of the Carmack Amendment provides that a receiving rail
carrier must be one that "receives" the cargo "for domestic rail transportation at the journey's point of origin.""8 Under a through bill of lading,
in which the cargo is received at an overseas location for transport to an
inland location in the United States, there is no receiving rail carrier
that receives the property at the journey's point of origin for domestic
rail transportation."9 Accordingly, the rail carrier was not required to
issue a Carmack-compliant bill of lading.20
In the case at bar, since defendant "K" Line was not a receiving rail
carrier and Union Pacific constituted a delivering carrier who was not
required to issue a Carmack bill of lading, no Carmack bill of lading was
required.2 1 Since the Carmack Amendment's limitation on the parties'
ability to agree to a forum selection did not apply to this shipment, the
forum selection clause was enforceable, and the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit was reversed. 2
II.

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

The Public Vessels Act vs. The Suits in Admiralty Act
In Uralde v. United States,2 3 the United States Coast Guard (Coast
Guard) was sued by the estate of a deceased Cuban national in a case
that called upon the Eleventh Circuit to examine the extent to which the

A.

15. Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2442 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 49 U.S.C.

§ 11706(a).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2443; see also 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a)(3).
Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2443.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a).
Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2444.
Id.
Id. at 2444-45.
Id. at 2449.
614 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2010).

1056

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Public Vessels Act (PVA)" and the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA)"
allow waiver of sovereign immunity. 26 The plaintiff, Augustin Uralde,
and his wife, Anay, attempted to enter the United States illegally as
passengers on board a speedboat. After a high speed chase, the Coast
Guard successfully disabled the speedboat by firing two shotgun rounds
into its engine. The sudden stop of the vessel caused Anay to forcefully
hit her head on the side of the boat, leading to her loss of consciousness
and bleeding from her head, nose, and ears.
Augustin pleaded with responding Coast Guard personnel to evacuate
Anay to a hospital immediately by using one of the Coast Guard aircraft
hovering over the scene. This request was allegedly sent up the chain
of command to Station Key West on two occasions but was denied both
times. Once a physician's assistant arrived on board the speedboat an
hour after the accident, he evaluated Anay's condition and recommended
she be immediately airlifted to a medical facility. That recommendation
was also denied, and Anay was ultimately taken ashore by way of an
inflatable boat. She died in transit before reaching land.28
Augustin sued the Coast Guard under the SAA and the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA)" for negligence in failing to provide proper on-scene
care or timely transportation to medical facilities and for unreasonably
delaying a proper diagnosis of his deceased wife's medical needs.o The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida found
that the case fell under the PVA, rather than the SAA, and that the
plaintiff failed to make a proper showing that the circumstances of his
case provided for a waiver of the Coast Guard's sovereign immunity
under the PVA." The PVA contains a requirement that, to overcome
the sovereign immunity enjoyed by agencies of the United States government, the plaintiff must show that his country of citizenship would
reciprocally allow a United States citizen to sue under similar circumstances.32 As Mr. Uralde was not able to prove that Cuba offers such
reciprocity to United States citizens, the district court dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under the PVA."

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

46 U.S.C. §§ 31101-31113 (2006).
46 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30918 (2006).
Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1283-84.
Id. at 1284.
Id.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (2006).
Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1284.
Id. at 1284-85.
46 U.S.C. § 31111.
Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1285.
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the grounds that the case did in fact
fall under the SAA, which has no reciprocity prerequisite to jurisdiction,
rather than the PVA.'
The court explained that the PVA is more
narrowly drafted to govern only those "[cilaims seeking relief for
damages caused directly by a public vessel, or by the negligent operation
thereof," while "[tihe SAA covers all remaining admiralty claims,
including those simply 'involving public vessels."'s The plaintiff's
claims of negligence on the part of the Coast Guard did not stem from
the operation of a public vessel but instead involved the Coast Guard's
decisions regarding how, and whether, to provide medical treatment to
a passenger on a private vessel.36 Since these claims are distinct from
the operation of a public vessel, the PVA-and its somewhat onerous
"reciprocity requirement"-did not apply to the plaintiff's claims, and the
district court's dismissal of Mr. Uralde's claims was therefore reversed."
B.

Salvage
The issue of sovereign immunity was once again a central dispute in
the case of Aqua Log, Inc. v. Georgia," in which the plaintiff salvor
filed in rem claims seeking title to, or a salvage award for, certain
submerged logs that had been lost in the Altamaha River while being
transported to coastal markets in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. The State of Georgia claimed ownership of these old growth
"deadhead" logs despite the fact that no action had been taken to recover
the logs until the State commissioned a sonar survey of the Altamaha
River in 2000. The State therefore intervened in the actions filed by
Aqua Log, alerting the courts to the State's claim of ownership and filing
motions to dismiss the in rem actions." The State argued that the
immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitutiono prohibited the federal courts from adjudicating the
State's interest in the logs."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused its discussion on a line of
cases dating back to the nineteenth century, in which the courts have

34.
35.
1558,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1286 (emphasis added) (quoting Marine Coatings v. United States, 71 F.3d
1562 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1288.
594 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1331-33.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Uralde, 594 F.3d at 1333.
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concluded that a governmental entity can assert the defense of sovereign
immunity from an in rem admiralty proceeding, such as this one, only
when it can demonstrate that "it is in possession of the res." 2 The
court then acknowledged, however, that case law had not provided a
comprehensive definition of what constitutes "possession."' After
surveying three seminal cases on the topic," the court summarized the
state of the law as "requirling] something more than mere ownership or
legal control of the res" and "possession by some act of physical dominion
or control." 5
In light of these requirements, the court turned its attention to the
level of possession and physical dominion over the deadhead logs that
had been exerted by the State prior to its assertion of sovereign
immunity.4 6 The State's claims of possession emanated principally
from its use of sonar to survey the location of the logs; its enactment of
a statute granting itself ownership of the logs; its ownership of the land
on which the logs sit; and its patrolling of the rivers where the logs are
located." These instances of "control" amounted to, "at most, . . .
constructive possession" over the logs and did not rise to the level of
physical control required by case law." The court therefore agreed
with the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia's
conclusion that the State did not enjoy sovereign immunity from
adjudication of its rights over these logs and affirmed the denial of the
motions to dismiss.

C. Maritime Jurisdiction
1. "Vessel" Status. The question of what constitutes a "vessel" is
an ever-changing topic that has become a popular subject of maritime
litigation over the last decade. In the case of Crimson Yachts v. Betty
Lyn II Motor Yacht,"o the Eleventh Circuit weighed in on the debate by
determining whether a yacht, subject to major overhaul-type repairs,

42. Id. at 1334.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1334-35 (discussing California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491
(1998), The Davis, 77 U.S. 15, 10 Wall. 15 (1869), and Compania Espanola de Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938)).
45. Id. at 1335-36 (quoting Compania Espanola, 303 U.S. at 75) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
46. Id. at 1337.
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1338.
50. 603 F.3d 864 (11th Cir. 2010).
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should be considered a vessel for maritime jurisdiction purposes.s" The
shipyard plaintiff, Crimson Yachts, filed suit to enforce a maritime lien
against the Betty Lyn II motor yacht after her owner failed to pay for
repairs to her decks, engines, generators, electronics, navigation
equipment, propellers, generators, and furniture, among other things."
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
determined that because a ship must be "in navigation" to qualify as a
vessel for maritime lien purposes, the major overhaul of the Betty Lyn
II motor yacht had taken the vessel out of navigation and therefore
divested the court of admiralty jurisdiction over the shipyard's in rem
claims."
The Eleventh Circuit opinion began with an extensive refresher course
on the history and purpose behind the development of maritime liens in
American jurisprudence." The court explained that the concept of the
maritime lien developed as a method of protecting both vessel owners
and repairmen alike; the court noted that the availability of in rem
recourse against the vessel has historically encouraged vendors to
provide necessary services to vessels whose owners would otherwise have
been unable to make immediate payment."
The ability of a repairman or service provider to proceed in rem has
throughout the history of maritime liens depended on the characterization of a ship as a "vessel."56 Both the statutory definition" and the
Supreme Court's recent formulation in Stewart v. Dutra Construction
Co. 58 focus on whether the watercraft is "capable of being used as a
means of transportation on water."" As legions of interpreting courts
will attest, however, this seemingly straightforward definition is
susceptible to many nuanced distinctions.6 0 Citing Stewart, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the dispositive consideration in making this
determination is "whether the watercraft's use as a means of transporta-

51. Id. at 867.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 867-68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. at 868-72. A practitioner seeking helpful language supporting the policy reasons
behind the maritime lien procedure should strongly consider reviewing this case for helpful
passages and case citations, as the opinion acts as a veritable playbook for drafting briefs
advocating in favor of a maritime lienor's position.
55. Id. at 869.
56. Id. at 871-72.
57. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
58. 543 U.S. 481 (2005).
59. Id. at 489 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 1 U.S.C. § 3.
60.

See, e.g., Crimson Yachts, 603 F.3d at 872.
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tion on water is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one."
The court readily admitted that the "novel or unusual situations" so
often present in these cases often lead to a "case-by-case approach" to
determining vessel status."
Adopting a broad view of when a watercraft should be considered
"capable of [being used for] transportation on water," the court pointed
out that vessel status has been found in instances when the craft had no
means of self-propulsion;" had only "residualnavigational capacity";'
In that regard, the court was
or had been drydocked for repairs.
quick to note that "all serious repairs upon the hulls of vessels are made
in dry docks" and, thus, to exempt drydocked ships "from admiralty
jurisdiction would 'deprive the admiralty courts of [the] largest and most
important"' repair disputes.6 6
The opinion last deals with the difficult concept of overhaul-type
repairs on a vessel.6 ' Acknowledging that there are some overhauls so
great that they transform "repair work into new-ship construction"-for
which there is no maritime jurisdiction-the court distinguished the
repair work in the case at bar.6 1 Since the purpose behind the maritime-lien concept is to protect maritime-repair providers, the court
refused to adopt a narrow view of vessel status that would effectively
strip the repairer of this important remedy in his time of greatest
need.6 ' The court therefore reversed the district court decision and
confirmed that the Betty Lyn II motor yacht was "a vessel subject to
maritime liens.nvo
2. Maritime Attachment. In McDermott Gulf Operating Co. v.
Con-Dive, LLC,n the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the trial court's
"vacatur of a maritime attachment" and its dismissal of an in personam
defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction.7 2 McDermott owned a vessel

61. Id. (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299, 1310 (11th Cir.
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. at 875 (quoting Nehring v. Steamship M/V Point Vail, 901 F.2d 1044, 1050 (11th
Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing United States v. Templeton, 378 F.3d 845, 850-51 (8th Cir. 2004)).
65. Id. (citing N. Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S.
119, 128 (1919)).
66. Id. at 875-76 (quoting Simmons v. The S.S. Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130, 143 (1909)).
67. Id. at 876.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 371 F. App'x 67 (11th Cir. 2010).
72. Id. at 68.
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that provided support to extended underwater operations. McDermott
was providing support for Con-Dive and its affiliate, Oceanografia (OSA),
which were constructing a pipeline beneath the Gulf of Mexico for the
state-owned Mexican oil company PEMEX." As Con-Dive was a
startup company, "OSA paid McDermott $1.8 million as security for ConDive's lease."" The "charter party," or lease, provided the vessel,
captain, and crew for $32,500 per day.15 Con-Dive installed $7 million
worth of equipment on McDermott's vessel to further the construction of
the pipeline but claimed that the equipment was ultimately transferred
to OSA." Con-Dive fell behind on the "charter hire," or lease payments, under the charter party." OSA paid McDermott $900,000 in
back hire, but once McDermott determined that no additional payments
were expected, "McDermott shut down the operation, claiming $5 million
in unpaid hire."" Further, McDermott refused to turn the equipment
back over to OSA, "claiming the equipment was security for the debt."79
OSA filed a criminal complaint with the district attorney for the State
of Campeche, Mexico, claiming theft of the equipment by McDermott.
The district attorney verbally ordered McDermott to turn over the
equipment pending further investigation into the dispute."
As
McDermott disputed the vitality of the district attorney's verbal order
due to the fact that the vessel was apparently in international waters at
the time of the order, upon the vessel's arrival at the Port of Mobile,
Alabama, "McDermott filed an in rem claim against the equipment ...
[and] in personam claims against Con-Dive, OSA, and OSA's manager."" The Southern District of Alabama concluded that "OSA owned
the equipment," that the "verbal order to surrender the equipment was
valid,. . . that McDermott was aware of the order, and .. . that [he] had
violated the order."82 As such, the district court vacated the attachment. Subsequently, Con-Dive moved to dismiss for lack of personal

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.

80. Id.
81. Id. The "in rem claim against the equipment [sought] arrest of the equipment
under Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims . . . [while the]
in personam claims [sought] attachment of the equipment under Supplemental Rule B."
Id.
82. Id.
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jurisdiction, citing the district court's ruling that OSA owned the
equipment. The district court dismissed Con-Dive."
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's exercise of equitable
power in maritime cases only for an abuse of discretion and for clear
error of factual findings.' The Eleventh Circuit confirmed the district
court's rulings, specifically holding that
[tihe appellants have not shown (1)that the district court clearly erred
in its fact findings or (2) that the district court abused its discretion in
concluding that the totality of the facts, as found in the district court's
order, warrant an equitable exception to the general rule upholding
maritime attachments.'
D.

Cruise Ship ickets

1. Forum Selection Clauses. The case of Seung v. Regent Seven
Seas Cruises, Inc.' presented the Eleventh Circuit with another
opportunity to rule on the application of a forum selection clause
contained in a cruise ship passenger ticket." California resident Nina
Seung sued cruise ship defendants Regent Seven Seas and M/V Paul
Gauguin Shipping Ltd. in the Southern District of Florida for injuries
she sustained while on a cruise aboard the M/S Paul Gauguin in Tahiti
and French Polynesia.' The plaintiff's passenger ticket contained a
forum selection clause that required the lawsuit to be brought in one of
two places: if the cruise included "a port of the United States of
America," the agreed-upon forum would be the Southern District of
Florida, while disputes arising from cruises that did not include a port
of the United States were required to be litigated in the courts of Paris,
France.89 The plaintiff appealed the district court's enforcement of the
forum selection clause and corresponding dismissal of her lawsuit.o
On appeal, the plaintiff challenged both the enforceability of the forum
selection clause and its applicability to the case at bar.91 The plaintiff
first argued that "the forum selection clause was unfair and unreasonable" due to (1) her financial inability to bring a lawsuit in Paris; (2) her

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
Id.
393 F. App'x 647 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 649-50.
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medical situation that limited her ability to travel to Paris; and (3) the
remoteness of the forum, which she argued was "chosen merely as a
means of discouraging passengers from bringing legitimate claims."92
After noting that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and
enforceable absent a "strong showing" by the plaintiff that enforcement
would be unfair or unreasonable, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with each
of the plaintiffs arguments in turn.93
The court first noted that "[tihe financial difficulty that a party might
[experience] in litigating in the selected forum is not a sufficient ground
by itself for refusal to enforce a valid forum selection clause."' The
plaintiff's argument that she would not be able to communicate with
healthcare providers or receive free medical treatment through Medicare
if she traveled to Paris was similarly unavailing, as the court was
unconvinced that this rose to the level of a "strong showing" of unreasonableness.95 Finally, the notion that Paris is a remote and alien forum
was given little credit, as the court cited to a Florida state court case
upholding the selection of Paris as a proper "neutral location" in another
case involving injuries aboard the M/S Paul Gauguin.96
The plaintiff's most novel-although ultimately unavailing-argument
played on the term "port of the United States of America" contained in
the forum selection clause.97 Although the M/S Paul Gauguin departed
from a maritime port in French Polynesia, the plaintiff attempted to
argue against the applicability of the Paris forum selection clause to this
case because she traveled to meet the vessel by departing on an airplane
from Los Angeles International Airport, "a port of the United States of
America."9 8 The court disagreed and noted that the plain language of
the contract focused on the cruise itself, and not the plaintiff's particular
"cruise package."9 The court therefore affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint."oo

92. Id. at 650.
93. Id. at 649-51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 650 (first alteration in original) (quoting P & S Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Canon
U.S.A., Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. (quoting Burns v. Radisson Seven Seas Cruises, Inc., 867 So. 2d 1191, 1193
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id.
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2. Statute of Limitations. In the case of Racca v. Celebrity
Cruises, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit determined "whether a contractual provision in a cruise ticket which limits a passenger's right to sue for
personal injuries to one year was reasonably communicated to the
plaintiff Ray Racca."102 On April 22, 2008, Racca filed a suit against
Celebrity Cruises, Inc. and Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., seeking
damages for injuries suffered on board the cruise ship on April 30, 2006.
The Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, holding that Racca's suit, which was filed outside the
cruise ticket's one-year limitation, was time barred.1 03
The contract included and the passenger ticket required that any
plaintiff or potential plaintiff provide written notice of the claim to the
defendants within six months of the date of the injury, and all law suits
"shall be commenced (filed) within one (1) year from the day when the
cause of action occurred and process was served within thirty (30) days
after filing, notwithstanding any provision of law of any state or country
to the contrary.nl04 There was no dispute that cruise lines are specifically authorized by 46 U.S.C. § 30508(b)(2)o' to place a one-year
limitation on a passenger's right to file personal injury lawsuits. 06
Further, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[clourts will enforce such a
limitation if the cruise ticket provided the passenger with reasonably
adequate notice that the limit existed and formed part of the passenger
contract." 07
With respect to the limitations provision, Racca contended that the
provision "was not reasonably communicated to him" because the
passenger ticket was about 100 pages, and the "font directing the guest
to the specific [imitation] section(s) [did] not stand out from the other
words .

..

nor [was] the language distinguishable by any highlight,

Racca further noted that he was in
bolding, italics or underlines."'
his late seventies. 0 9
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's findings that "the
ticket contract [was] only three (3) pages within the entire ... [biro-

101. 376 F. App'x 929 (11th Cir. 2010).
102. Id. at 930.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 46 U.S.C. § 30508(b)(2) (2006).
106. Racca, 376 F. App'x at 930-31.
107. Id. at 931 (quoting Nash v. Kloster Cruise A/S, 901 F.2d 1565, 1566 (11th Cir.
1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id.
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chure" presented to Racca; the warning of important limitations
"appear[ed] on the face of the ...

[birochure;" the brochure index

provided that the ticket contract was on a specific page of the brochure;
and that Racca never provided the written notice within the six months
as required by the contract."'o The Eleventh Circuit, in affirming the
district court's grant of summary judgment, held that "[a] passenger's
failure to actually read the contractual provision at issue does not
preclude his being bound.""'1 Further, the Eleventh Circuit determined that it was not unreasonable to expect Racca to read the threepage contract, which the face of the brochure directed him to do, after
his injury or after one of his multiple surgeries.112
E. Attorney Fees in Maritime Cases
The case of Misener Marine Construction, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging
Co."' afforded the court an opportunity to clarify when a prevailing
party to an admiralty dispute can collect attorney fees."' The parties
entered into a contract arising out of Misener Marine's construction of
a new dock in the Port of Savannah. Misener Marine's contract called
for the river to be dredged in the vicinity of the dock construction area,
for which Misener Marine subcontracted with Norfolk Dredging."'
The scope of work for the dredging subcontract called for Norfolk
Dredging to dredge in the area of two temporary mooring dolphins.
While the Steven N was secured to these dolphins, they were pulled
partially from the riverbed, causing the vessel to release from its moored
position.1 6 After Misener Marine sued Norfolk Dredging in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia for negligence,
breach of contract, and breach of warranty, Norfolk Dredging counterclaimed for payment under the Georgia Prompt Pay Act (GPPA)117 for
the dredging work and attorney fees."s
Further investigation of the cause of the failure of the mooring
dolphins led Misener Marine to conclude that Norfolk Dredging was not

110. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. The court did "not consider Racca's argument ... under Texas Consumer
Protection Statutes because he failed to raise it in the district court." Id.
113. 594 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2010).
114. Id. at 834.
115. Id. at 834-35. It is significant to note that the dredging subcontract between
Misener Marine and Norfolk Dredging did not contain a clause providing for the award of
attorney fees. Id. at 835.
116. Id. at 835.
117. O.C.G.A. §§ 13-11-1 to -11 (2010).
118. Misener Marine, 594 F.3d at 835.
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to blame, so they dismissed their claims against Norfolk Dredging.
Norfolk Dredging subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on
its counterclaim, which the district court granted. In ruling that Norfolk
Dredging should be awarded its attorney fees on top of the principal
amount, the district court initially found that there is no established
federal rule respecting attorney fees in maritime disputes, and that
recovery by Norfolk Dredging under the GPPA would not be inconsistent
with established maritime law."
The district court reserved ruling on the amount of attorney fees to
which Norfolk Dredging was entitled. Before conducting a hearing to
determine that amount, however, the presiding judge who initially ruled
in Norfolk Dredging's favor passed away.120 The judge to whom the
case was transferred reversed the ruling and held that "the GPPA
conflicted with a general principle of maritime law, that each party
bears its own attorneys' fees."121
In affirming the final ruling of the district court, the court of appeals
was quick to point out that the American Rule 22 is the prevailing law
in the Eleventh Circuit regarding attorney fees in maritime disputes-to
wit, "[tihe prevailing party in an admiralty case is not entitled to recover
Of course, there are
its attorneys' fees as a matter of course.""2
exceptions to this general rule, such as when attorney fees "are provided
by the statute governing the claim," or the losing party "acted in bad
faith," or if "there is a contract providing for the indemnification of
attorneys' fees." 24 The court disagreed with Norfolk Dredging's
assertion that the GPPA was the "statute governing the claim" since it
is not a federal statute. 2 ' The court further noted that the applicable
126
contract between the parties was silent on the issue of attorney fees.
Finally, the court denied Norfolk Dredging's request "to incorporate the
GPPA into substantive maritime law" because the American Rule has
ensconced itself as "a characteristic feature of maritime law."127 The

119. Id. at 836.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 840 n.17 ("The idea that each party should bear its own attorneys' fees is
referred to as the American Rule in contrast to the English standard wherein the
prevailing party is awarded attorneys' fees.").
123. Id. at 838 (quoting Natco Ltd. P'ship v. Moran Towing of Fla., Inc., 267 F.3d 1190,
1193 (11th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. (quoting Natco Ltd. P'ship v. Moran Towing of Fla., Inc.,,267 F.3d 1190, 1193
(11th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 838-39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 839.
127. Id. at 839-41.
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ruling of the district court denying Norfolk Dredging its attorney fees
was therefore affirmed. 2 8
F

Marine Insurance

1. Proximate Cause of a Loss. In New Hampshire Insurance Co.
v. Krilich,29 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the proximate cause of the
partial sinking of a vessel "at her berth in clear weather and calm
seas." 3 0 After the 110-foot yacht sank, the insurer sought a declaratory judgment as to whether it was liable to the owner and additional
insured under a marine insurance policy."3' "'[Any loss or damage
arising out of . .. lack of reasonable care or due diligence . . . in the

operation or maintenance' of the vessel" was expressly excluded from the
policy.'32 The insurer argued that the failure to maintain the vessel
was the cause of loss, while the insured argued that a fracture in the
vessel's keel was the cause of loss. The Southern District of Florida
found that there was indeed a fracture in the keel but ultimately ruled
that the damaged keel was not the proximate cause of loss.' Instead,
the district court found that the failure to maintain, among other things,
bilge pumps and alarms "was the proximate, efficient cause of the
vessel's submersion," and therefore was not covered by the marine
insurance policy.13 4 The district court determined that the keel
fracture allowed water to enter the vessel's black water holding tank,
which was not securely closed, causing it to overflow. The overflow filled
the bilges and engine room causing the vessel to slowly sink. When the
water line reached the sea chests, which were also unsecured, the engine
room flooded. The bilge pumps were inoperable, and the bilge alarms
never sounded."'
The parties' pretrial stipulations stated that the insurance policy was
governed by maritime law, Florida law, or both.'"' Therefore, on
appeal the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of proximate cause
under both maritime law and Florida law."' "Under federal maritime
law 'the proximate cause is the efficient cause and not a merely

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 841.
387 F. App'x 940 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 941.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 941-42.
Id. at 942 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 941.
Id. at 942.
Id.
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incidental cause which may be nearer in time to the result.'""as The
Florida concurrent cause doctrine "permits coverage when the injury is
caused by multiple causes and one of the causes is an insured risk."39
However, the doctrine applies only "when the causes are not related and
dependent, but rather involve separate and distinct risks."o
Upon review of the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit held that the "keel
fracture was not a separate and distinct risk" but was one of several
related causes.'
As such, it made no difference whether general
maritime law or Florida law was applied. The keel fracture was not the
proximate cause of loss under either.'4 2
2. Interpretation of Marine Policies under State Law. In the
case of Contender Fishing Team, LLC v. City of Miami,14 the Eleventh
Circuit addressed coverage issues under the City of Miami's marine
insurance policy."' Vessels owned by Contender Fishing Team, LLC
(Contender) and the City collided in Biscayne Bay. An occupant of the
Contender vessel filed suit against the City and several other parties to
recover for bodily injuries sustained in the collision with the City's police
boat.145 The City's insurance policy at issue was entitled "Marina
Operators Legal Liability Policy." 46 After the Southern District of
Florida determined that the policy did not offer coverage to accidents
involving city police boats, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the grant of
summary judgment and whether the court had jurisdiction. 4 1 On the
issue of jurisdiction, the court summarily held that the summary
judgment was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3)148 because this
is an "appeal of an order determining rights and liabilities in an
admiralty case."

138. Id. (quoting Lanasa Fruit S.S. & Imp. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 302 U.S. 556, 562
(1938)).
139. Id. (quoting Hrynkiw v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 844 So. 2d 739, 745 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. at 942-43 (quoting Hrynkiw v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 844 So. 2d 739, 745
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 943.
142. Id.
143. No. 10-10454, 2010 WL 5095873 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2010).
144. Id. at *1.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *1-2.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (2006).
149. Contender FishingTeam, 2010 WL 5095873, at *1.
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The Eleventh Circuit then addressed the district court's conclusion
that the City was not covered under the policy."so The Eleventh
Circuit reiterated its position that marine insurance policies are to be
interpreted under state law."5 ' Under Florida law, the policy limited
the types of city employees and vessels covered."5 2 The court held that
"the City's interpretation that this Policy includes all boats operated by
a city employee acting in his or her capacity as a city employee for all
city business is completely unreasonable." 53
Forum Non Conveniens
In Popescu v. CMA-CGM,' 54 the court addressed jurisdictional and
forum issues under 46 U.S.C. § 30104'15 (referred to as the Jones Act),
A
the Death on the High Seas Act,s 6 and general maritime law.'
wrongful death action was filed in the Southern District of Florida based
upon a seaman's death while at port in Malaysia. The deceased seaman
was a Romanian citizen who worked on board the Rigoletto, a Frenchowned, French-flagged vessel. CMA CGM moved to dismiss the
complaint based upon forum non conveniens.'5 s In a short, fiveparagraph opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the action. 5 9
The Eleventh Circuit noted the application of the "Lauritzen-Rhoditis
The district
factors" in the district court's "well-reasoned order."'
court noted that the parties "conceded [that] the Lauritzen factors weigh
against the application of United States law."' 6 ' The Lauritzen factors
"determine when courts should apply the maritime law of the United
States, including the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas
Act." 6 2 "Lauritzen identified seven relevant factors: (1) place of the
wrongful act, (2) law of the flag, (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured,
(4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner, (5) place of contract, (6)
G.

150. Id. at *1-2.
151. Id. at *1.
152. Id. at *2.
153. Id.
154. 384 F. App'x 902 (11th Cir. 2010).
155. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
156. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
157. Popescu, 384 F. App'x at 903.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Popescu v. CMA CGM, No. 09-20860-CIV, 2009 WL 5606131, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
5, 2009).
162. Id. at *6.
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inaccessibility of a foreign forum, and (7) law of the forum."163 Because the parties conceded that the Lauritzen factors weighed against
application of United States law, the district court focused primarily on
the remaining Rhoditis factor."
The district court, in order "ttlo effectuate the liberal purposes of the
Jones Act . . . must consider the 'real nature of the operation' and take
a 'cold objective look at the actual operational contacts that [the] ship
and [the] owner have with the United States."' 5 Because "the
[Rigoletto] had no contact with the United States[] and ... CMA CGM's
contacts with the United States were insufficient to constitute a
substantial base of operations," the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.'e

163. Id. (citing Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953)).
164. Id. at *7.
165. Id. at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S.
306, 310 (1970)).
166.

Id. at *1-2.

